The paper analyzes the question of which cost characteristics are exhibited by the rms that exit an oligopolistic market when costs are asymmetric and rms can credibly be forced out by the remaining competitors. The main results are: (i) if reentry is impossible (due to the presence of large sunk costs), then the rm with the highest marginal cost function dtays in; if reentry is costless then the rm with the highest average cost exits. Consequenty sunk costs not only aect the number of rms in an industry, but they also enter the determination of the type of rms that resist predation.
Introduction
In markets where rms dier as to their cost functions is it possible to predict what are the cost characteristics of the rms that stay or that exit? In perfectly competitive markets one can predict that the rms exiting the market are those with highest average costs. This prediction has been extended by Ghemawat and Nalebu (1985) , (1990) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) to the case of declining industries with few competitors. Their analyses show indeed that, in a war of attrition, the less ecient rm will be the rst to exit 1 . However many recent works (see chapters 8 and 9 in Tirole (1988) and Wilson (1992) ) show that exit can occur in a wide variety of circumstances. We are therefore led to ask if the above prediction continue to hold in imperfectly competitive markets where rms are not engaged in a war of attrition.
This paper argues that the exiting rm may be the one with the lowest average cost function. To identify the basic argument leading to this conclusion, consider the following example. Three rms decide, at a rst stage, to stay in the market or to exit and, at a second stage, those that stay decide how m u c h to produce. All rms have identical xed costs. They also have constant marginal costs with rm i's marginal cost being strictly smaller than rm j's marginal cost which, in turn, is strictly smaller than rm k's. Firms can therefore be ranked according to their average cost function with rm i having the lowest one.
Then suppose that if all rms stay in the market, each of them will obtain a strictly negative prot at the Cournot equilibrium while, if only two rms stay in, their Cournot prot is positive and the third rm receives a zero prot. It immediately follows that for each couple of rms to stay in the market and to produce their Cournot quatity is an equilibrium of the two stage game. They are therefore three equilibria and a prediction on the cost characteristics of the exiting rm cannot be based only on this two stage game. Note, incidentally, that these equilibria are all Pareto ecient so that one cannot use coalitional proofness (see Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) ) to select one or the other.
A possible route to follow for obtaining a prediction is indicated by the literature on endogenous coalition formation, as in Aumann and Myerson(1988) , Gul (1989) , and especially Bloch (1990a) and (1990b) . These works use a non-cooperative sequential game to analyze the formation of coalition structures. In the same way, one can assume that a coalition formation game precedes the play of a game of the kind illustrated by the example above. We here adopt a specication of the coalition formation game where each rm in turn makes a declaration consisting of (i) a set of rms that stay in, (ii) a payo vector for the three rms that can be obtained by the play of a non-cooperative equilibrium of the two stage game. One can interpret these declarations as \oers", and we model the acceptance (refusal) of an oer as the making of an identical (dierent) declaration. Since a declaration corresponds to one equilibrium, if two rms make the same declaration they agree to play the same equilibrium. This determines which equilibrium is played and the payos to all rms irrespective of the declaration made by the third rm.
It is important to realize that once two rms have adopted their equilibrium strategies the third rm has no better alternative than the play of its own best reply to those strategies, which coincides with the strategy specied in the equilibrium chosen by the other two rms. Therefore the way p a yos are determined has nothing to do with the application of a majority rule in collective decision making.
For further reference we call this sequential game \the cartel formation game". The equilibrium of this game gives a prediction of the rm that exits. For each order in which rms declare, there will be a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in the cartel formation game. But, as one can expect, the equilibrium outcome will in general depend on the order of declaration. We are nevertheless able to show that, as long as a rm exits the market at the equilibrium, the cost characteristics of this rm can be identied and are independent of the order of declaration. The cartel formation game will therefore provide a strong prediction on the characteristics of the exiting rm.
In the example the unique equilibrium is with rms j and k making the same declaration of the form (i) fj; kg, and (ii) payo zero for rm i, and
Cournot payos for j and k. A proof of this statement is trivial. Indeed the Cournot prot of a rm is increasing in the marginal cost of its rival which implies that rm j makes the highest equilibrium prot when k stays on the market and rm k makes the highest equilibrium prot when j stays on. Hence the rm exiting the market is the one with the lowest average costs, and not with the highest, as it would be predicted in a war of attrition or in perfect competition.
One is led to wonder if the dierence in prediction could disappear if rms play a supergame instead of a one-shot game. Indeed, in a supergame, rms are generally able to maximize joint prots and, since joint prot maximization requires the minimization of variable cost, they will be induced to internalize the gain made by having an ecient partner.
In what follows we shall generalize the example given above by considering a general cost function and a production game consisting of an innite repetition of the two-stage game of the example. In this game, we say that a t w o-rm cartel is feasible if there exists an equilibrium of the production game where these rms stay in and the third stays out along the equilibrium path. Obviously the analysis is interesting only if the production game displays at least two dierent feasible cartels.
The main results are that (i) if reentry is impossible, then the rm with the highest marginal cost function stays on at all equilibria of the cartel formation game, for any order of declaration, while xed costs only determine the set of feasible cartels. (ii) If reentry is possible then the rm with the highest average cost exits. These results imply that the dierence in prediction does not depend on the possibility or not to collude, but rather depends upon the existence or not of sunk costs for reentry.
A n o vel implication of the presence of sunk costs appears here: not only, as it is already well known from the literature on entry preemption, they can determine the number of rms, but they also enter the determination of the type of rms that stay in a market.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next Section we introduce our assumptions relative to the cost and demand functions and we analyse the equilibrium outcomes of the production game. In Section 3, the cartel formation game is formally presented. Our results are stated in Section 4 for the unprotable reentry case and in Section 5 for the case of costless reentry. In Section 6 we test the robustness of the results for the case of unprotable reentry to changes in the cartel formation game. The results stated in section 4 are shown to go through. Section 7 presents some concluding considerations to relate the results to the literature on transaction cost economics.
The production game
We consider a supergame involving three rms. We shall denote this game by 0 and the set of rms by N. 0 consists of the innite repetition of the two-stage game where (i) at the rst stage each rm decides to stay i n o r to stay out of the market and (ii) at the second stage the rms which have decided to stay in the market, hereafter referred to as the active rms, play an usual Cournot game whilst an inactive rm produces nothing. At each stage decisions are made simultaneously and actions taken at the rst stage are perfectly observed by all rms before they choose their production at the second stage. The scalar , belonging to the open interval (0; 1), denotes the discount factor common to all rms.
The purpose of this preparatory section is twofold. On the one hand, we give a precise content to the concept of a feasible cartel. On the other hand, for each feasible cartel s, we characterize the set of all payo vectors that rms can obtain at a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of 0 where along the equilibrium path only the rms in cartel s stay in the market at each period.
To simplify the exposition we shall proceed in three steps. First, in subsection 2.1., we shall introduce the assumptions on the cost and demand functions. In the second step, in subsection 2.2., we shall ignore the rst stage of the constituent game and concentrate on the game 0 (s) consisting of the innite repetition of the Cournot game where the set of players is given by s (i.e. rms in s decide to stay in the market at every period and the rm outside s, i f s 6 = N, decides to stay out of the market at every period). We can thereby use the results from the literature on innitely repeated games to bring forth a characterization of the set of equilibrium payo vectors of 0 (s) . In the last step, subsection 2.3., we introduce the possibility for each rm to exit the market. This will allow us to dene what we mean by a feasible cartel and characterize, for each feasible cartel, the set of attainable payo vectors V (s).
Assumptions
An active rm has to pay a (time-invariant) xed cost F i as well as a variable cost given by the function c(q i ; i ; q i ) where i and q i are (time-invariant) rmspecic parameters and q i stands for quantity (the time index that should be assigned to the quantity v ariable is omitted as long as this does not create confusion). If a rm decides to stay out, it produces nothing and incurs no cost. Furthermore if a rm, say i, has decided to stay out at period t 0 1, it must pay a reentry cost, R i , if it decides to stay in the market at period t. We simplify the analysis by considering in turn two polar cases namely: Assumption 1 Reentry is unprotable i.e. R i is as large as we want, for i = 1 ; 2; 3. Assumption 2 Reentry is costless i.e. R i = 0 , for i = 1 ; 2; 3.
The variable cost function c depends upon two rm-specic parameters, i and q i . q i stands for the rm i's capacity constraint which means that, for a given i , rm i cannot produce more than q i and accordingly c is only dened for 0 q i q i . On the other hand, i is a convenient w a y to rank rms according to their marginal cost function. We shall indeed suppose that for any quantity q such that the marginal cost to produce this quantity is well dened for rms i and j, rm j's marginal cost is strictly greater than the one of rm i if and only if j > i . More precisely way, let X i = [ 0 ;
q i ], then our assumptions regarding the variable cost function of any rm are the following: Note that we suppose that rms produce perfect substitutes in order to be able to concentrate ourselves only upon the inuence of the cost characteristics on market structure.
For an active rm the prot function (gross of the reentry cost) in the Cournot game will be written as:
where Q 0i = Q 0 q i . W e shall assume: Assumption 5 For all i 2 N, i is strictly quasi-concave on X i 2[0;
Furthermore there exists (q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ) 2 X 1 2 X 2 2 X 3 such that, for all i, i (q i ; Q 0i ) > 0. Obviously these assumptions, together with the restriction that any active rm i must choose a quantity in [0;
q i ], are sucient for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. The second part of Assumption 5 will ensure, as we shall see later on, that there exists some \agreements" between the three rms with all of them remaining on the market. This could be assumed away, in fact simplifying the analysis without changing the results, but it is kept for the sake of generality.
The last restriction on the cost and demand functions is that whenever only two rms are active then, for any quantity its opponent can produce, a rm can achieve a positive prot. Formally, let us dene w i (s) with s = fi; jg as the minimal payo rm i can guarantee to itself when it faces rm j, i.e.: w i (i; j) = min
Under assumption 4 i is a strictly decreasing function of q j . Therefore, dening q R i ( q j ) = arg max q i 2X i i (q i ; q j ), we have:
Assumption 6 For all i; j 2 N, w i (i; j) 0 and q R i ( q j ) < q i . This will guarantee on the one hand that the market cannot be monopolized and on the other hand that there exist couples (q i ; q j ) such that i (q i ; q j ) > w i (i; j). We n o w turn to the characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo vectors of the innitely repeated game 0 (s) .
Equilibrium payos in 0 (s)
The typical payo for rm i in the game 0 (s) is given by:
Innitely repeated games with discounting have been extensively analysed in the literature. It has been established (see, for instance, Theorem 3.2 in Sorin (1992) ) that the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payo vectors of 0 (s) converges (with respect to the Haussdorf topology) to the set of individually rational and feasible payo vectors of the constituent game as the discount factor tends to one 2 . This is one of the version of the so-called Folk Theorem. Accordingly, for our purposes we only need to characterize the set of individually rational and feasible payo vectors of the Cournot one-shot game where the set of players is given by s. This set is denoted W(s).
To begin with let us denote the set of feasible payo vectors with three active rms by F(N) and the one with two active rms by F(i; j). Let X = X i 2 X j 2 X k , F(N) and F(i; j) are given by: F(N) = convex hull f (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) j 9 (q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ) 2 X such that P i = i (q i ; Q 0i ) for i = 1 ; 2; 3 g : F(i; j) = convex hull f (P i ; P j ) j 9 (q i ; q j ; 0) 2 X such that P i = i (q i ; Q 0i ) and P j = j (q j ; Q 0j )g : When the three rms are active, each active rm can guarantee to itself a prot given by:
Accordingly the set of individually rational and feasible payo vectors when rms in s being active and #s 2 is simply:
W(s) = f (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) j (P i ) i2s 2 F (s) ; P k = 0 for k 6 2 s and P i w i (s) 8i 2 s g :
2 Provided the set of individually rational and feasible points has a non-empty interior. This is clearly the case under Assumption 6.
Then, denoting the set of perfect Nash equilibrium payo vectors of 0 (s) by W (s) , w e h a ve from the Folk Theorem that W (s) converges to W(s) when tends to one. We shall furthermore denote by w i (s) the minimal payo rm i can obtain in W (s).
Equilibrium payos in 0
We n o w consider the game 0 , namely the innite repetition of the twostage constituent game where, at the rst stage, rms decide to stay i n o r to stay out of the market and, at the second stage, active rms decide the quantity they produce. Let V (s) denotes the set of attainable payo vectors for cartel s. At the end of this section it will possible to characterize V (s) .
Note that this set will depend on which of the two assumptions, 1 or 2, is taken to hold.
To begin with, let us remark that, from assumption 5, there will always exist subgame perfect equilibria in 0 where along the equilibrium path the three rms stay in the market at each period. The set of payo vectors which can be obtained at equilibria of this kind is denoted by V (N) and it is easily veried that it coincides with W (N) \ R 3 + . W e shall furthermore denote by e k (N) a subgame perfect equilibrium of 0 where the three rms stay i n a t each period along the equilibrium path and where rm k obtains a per-period prot equal to maxf0; w k (N)g and each other rm, say h, obtains a prot strictly greater than maxf0; w h (N)g 3 .
Then let us suppose that there is a rm, say k, such that w k (N) < 0. Consider rst the existence of subgame perfect equilibria of 0 where rm k stays out of the market at each period 4 . F or suciently close to one, the following strategy combination is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting after the three rms have decided to stay in the market at a given period: produce ( q i ; q j ; q R k ( q i + q j )) followed by, wathever the quantity produced by rm k, either e k (N) if rms i and j have produced or 3 Note that there are many output combinations that give rm k a p a y o equal to w k (N). For some of them the payos to i and j will be as specied in e k (N). 4 We implicitly assume that rm k's outside opportunities has a per period value of zero.
However the reader will easily verify that all our results go through if we have assumed that the per period value of rm i's outside opportunities, i = 1 ; 2; 3, is given by a function O( i ) satisfying @O=@ i 0. The point is to deneŵ i (s) = w i (s)0O( i ) for all possible cartels and work withŵ i (s) instead of w i (s).
both did not produce q i and q j respectively, o r e i (N) if rm i did not produce q i while rm j has produced q j , o r e j (N) if rm j did not produce q j while rm i has produced q i . This is an equilibrium, in the subgame starting at the node where the three rms have entered the market, with rm k having a negative payo. Therefore using this equilibrium as a punishment triggered by the rm k's decision to stay in the market, rms i and j can force rm k to stay out of the market at each period. We shall refer to this situation by saying that the cartel fi; jg is feasible. It must be clear that the feasibility of a particular cartel, say fi; jg, neither excludes nor implies the feasibility of another cartel like fi; kg for instance.
To sum up: we consider that the grand cartel, N, is always feasible since, by assumption 5, there always exist subgame perfect equilibria of 0 where, along the equilibrium path the three rms decide to stay in at each period.
On the other hand we say that a two-rms cartel, say fi; jg, is feasible if and only if rms i and j can credibly predate rm k i.e. w k (N)< 0 5 . W e shall denote the set of feasible cartels by S.
Before examining the set of equilibrium payo vectors of a feasible cartel in the game 0 , we must recognize that there is a third kind of market structure which could emerge namely the monopoly one. However this possibility is ruled out, whether reentry is costless or unprotable, by assumption 6.
We n o w turn to the characterization of the set of equilibrium payo vectors that a feasible cartel, say fi; jg, can obtain in a subgame starting after the decision of rm k to stay out of the market and the decisions of rms i and j to stay in the market. Consider rst the case where the reentry cost is so high that it is never protable for rm k to decide to stay in the market at any period of this subgame (i.e. assumption 1 holds). In this situation assumption 6 will ensure that rms i and j will decide to stay in the market at each period of the subgame. This immediately implies that the set of equilibrium payo vectors of the subgame coincides with the set of equilibrium payo vectors of the game 0 (s) , with s = fi; jg. Therefore we have V (s) = W (s) for all feasible two-rms cartel s.
Consider now the case where reentry is costless, i.e. assumption 2 holds. Then the worst per-period payo rm i will obtain is equal to maxf0; w i (N)g. Indeed consider the subgame which starts after rms i and j have decided to stay in while rm k has decided to stay out of the market and either rm i or rm j has deviated from their respective quantity specied in a given strategy combination. Since reentry is costless, e i (N) and e j (N) are perfect equilibrium of this subgame. In other words, with costless reentry, rm k can be used to punish a deviation by a member of the cartel so that the worst payo a rm, say rm i, will obtain if it deviates from a specied quantity is simply the maximum between 0 and w i (N). Note that if cartel fj; kg is feasible, if rm i deviates it could be punished by its exclusion of the market leading to a zero payo. But since cartel fj; kg is feasible if and only if w i (N) < 0, the worst payo rm i will obtain is still equal to maxf0; w i (N)g. It follows that the set of equilibrium payo vector a feasible two-rm cartel s can obtain under assumption 2, V (s), is simply equal to the following set:
V (s) = f (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) j (P i ) i2s 2 F (s) ; P k = 0 for k 6 2 s; and P i maxf0; w i (N)g8i 2 s g : (3) Note that, since w i (N) is strictly smaller than w i (s) for any s 6 = N to which i belongs, then V (s) is larger than W (s).
The cartel formation game
Due to the multiplicity of equilibria in the production game, rms must coordinate upon the play of a particular equilibrium before the production game starts. The way rms solve this coordination problem is described by a three-stage game where at each stage one rm makes a declaration. The order in which declarations are made is exogeneously given and it is common knowledge.
A rm i's declaration, d i , consists of a feasible cartel, s i , to which rm i must belong and of a payo vector p i = ( p i1 ; p i2 ; p i3 ) which must belong to V (s i ). The set of rm i's declarations is thus D i = f(s; p) j i 2 s; s 2 S and p 2 V (s)g. F urthermore let H i denote the set of declarations preceding that of rm i with H i = ; if rm i is the rst to make a declaration. Then a strategy for rm i is a mapping i : H i ! D i .
Let d denote a declaration vector, rm i will receive the payo g i given by:
otherwise: Accordingly rm i will receive its proposed payo p ii if its declaration is compatible with (identical to) either that of rm j (i.e. d i = d j ) or that of rm k (i.e. d i = d k ) or both. If the declarations of rms j and k are compatible then rm i will obtain the payo assigned to it in the rm j's declaration. This payo assignment follows from the fact that, once two rms agree to play according to a partiacular equilibrium of the production game, the third one's best response in the production game is to play according to this equilibrium too. Consequently all rms will receive the payo corresponding to the equilibrium upon which two rms have decided to coordinate. Finally, i f all the declarations are pairwise incompatible no agreement is possible and rm i will receive some predetermined payo g i . W e suppose that rm i's reservation payo, g i , corresponds to the worst payo it can obtain in the production game 0 or, in other words, the best payo rm i can guarantee to itself in this game. Accordingly 6 , g i = maxf0; w i (N)g 8 i 2 N. T o end up note that since any strategy combination ( i ; j ; k ) leads to a declaration vector the payo of rm i in the cartel formation game will be given by g i .
4 Equilibria in the cartel formation game with unprotable reentry
We turn now to the characterization of the equilibria of the cartel formation game when, in the production game, reentry is unprotable i.e. assumption 1 holds. To simplify the exposition we shall introduce some pieces of terminology: We shall say that, for a given order of declaration, say ( i; j; k), cartel s forms if and only if, for this order of declaration, there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the cartel formation game, 3 , leading to a declaration vector d 3 dened by
On the other hand, we shall say that cartel s will not form for a given order of declaration if and only if there does not exist at least one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the cartel formation game satisfying the above requirement.
As one could expect subgame perfect equilibria of the cartel formation game dier according to the order of declaration. However we can identify the cartels which do not form whatever the order of declaration. Let W i (s) be the highest one-period prot that rm i can obtain in W (s). Then, Proposition 1 Suppose all our assumptions except assumption 2 hold. Then there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) and whatever the order of declaration we have:
1. A cartel forms, 2. if S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; N g and j < k , then cartel fi; jg does not form, 3. if S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg; N g and i < j < k , then (a) cartel fi; jg does not form and (b) if in addition q j q i and W j (i; j) W j (N) then cartels fi; jg and fi; kg do not form.
Fixed costs, marginal cost functions and capacity constraints determine all together which cartels are feasible i.e. which rms can be forced to stay out by the two others. However on the basis of marginal cost functions alone we can conclude that if the rm with the highest marginal cost function belongs to a feasible two-rms cartel then it will stay in the market. This means that a sucient condition for the highest marginal cost rm to survive is the existence of a partner with which it can predate the third rm. Furthermore if in addition we suppose that q j q i 7 and W j (i; j) W j (N) then we can be more precise about the survival of the lowest marginal cost rm. Indeed in this case the results state that if a rm is forced to stay out of the market it 7 As the reader will see in the proof of Lemma 4 the result will hold under the weaker but less transparent (sucient) condition: i (q R j (q i ); q i ) i (q R i (q j ); q j ).
is the one with the lowest marginal cost function once there exists a feasible cartel to which this rm does not belong. Accordingly a low marginal cost function and, since the results do not depend on the level of xed costs, a low average cost function is not an advantage to survive in a market, if we except its role in the determination of the set of feasible cartels. Put in another way, our results suggest that to face predation the use of a technology leading to a small xed cost and a (relatively) high marginal cost function do provide strong advantages with respect to the use of a technology leading to a large xed cost and a low marginal cost function. The cornerstone underlying our results is:
Lemma 1 Remark immediately that the constraints in these optimization programs do not depend on the xed cost and hence the constraints dier only in the level of . For q i = q i , the constraints in these maximization programs are satised if and only if q j = q R j ( q i ) and q k = q R k ( q i ) respectively. Under our assumptions we obviously have q R j ( q i ) > q R k ( q i ) if and only if j < k . F uthermore for any given q i 2 [0; q i ) let us dierentiate j (q j ; q i ) = w j (i; j) with respect to q j and j . W e obtain: @ j (q j ; q i ) @q j dq j = " @c(q j ; j ;
where all derivatives are evaluated at (q j ; q i ) such that j (q j ; q i ) = w j (i; j). Since j is a strictly quasi-concave function we have that @ j (q j ; q i )=@q j is strictly negative for any q j 2 (q R ( q i );
q j ] and strictly positive for any q j 2 [0; q R ( q i )). Moreover, by assumption 3, marginal cost is increasing in so that @c(q j ; j ; q j )=@ j 0 @c(q R ( q i ); j ; q j )=@ j is strictly positive for any q j 2 (q R ( q i );
q j ] and strictly negative for any q j 2 [0; q R ( q i )). It then follows that dq j =d j is strictly negative for any given q i 2 [0; q i ) and q j satisfying j (q j ; q i ) = w j (i; j). This establishes that the isoprot curve j (q j ; q i ) = w j (i; j) shifts rightwards in the coordinate (q j ; q i ) a s j decreases. As shown in Figure 1 the result then follows. 2
As shown by the proof, the xed cost does not matter since it aects both sides of the constraint in the maximization program in the same way. Hence, for any quantity produced by rm i, the quantity required to satisfy the constraint is independent of the xed cost. On the other hand, the level of , i.e. the level of the marginal cost for a given quantity produced, aects the constraint in two ways. First, if the right-hand side of the constraint were independent of then, in the coordinates of Figure 1 , rm k's isoprot curve will be entirely below the rm j's one as long as j < k . This eect reects the advantage to form a cartel with a low marginal cost rm. Second, however, the minimal payo required by a rm to participate in a cartel with rm i clearly decreases with . This translates the intuition that a low marginal cost rm will be more greedy than a rm with a higher marginal cost. What the Lemma states is that the second eect dominates the rst one.
According to this result, for k larger than j , rm k can always give to rm i a greater payo than the highest payo rm i can obtain with rm j.
On the other hand if cartel fi; jg forms then rm k will receive a zero payo while it will obtain at least w k (i; k)> 0 if cartel fi; kg forms. Hence, loosely speaking, rm k has always the opportunity and the willingness to prevent the formation of cartel fi; jg so that this cartel cannot form.
Remark that we cannot exclude the formation of the grand cartel, N, for all orders of declaration. Indeed consider, for instance, the case where S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; N g with j < k and rm i is the rst rm to declare.
If w k (i; k) is suciently large it could happen that W i (i; k) is strictly smaller than the greatest payo rm i can obtain in V (N). Consequently, rm i will propose the formation of the grand cartel and the best either rm j or rm k (or both) can do is to make a declaration compatible with that of rm i 8 . This shows that the availability of a predatory strategy is not sucient for predation to occur.
Finally, Part 3 of Proposition 1 corresponds to the example given in the Introduction above, except for the feasibility of the grand cartel. However, to have the same prediction, i.e. that the low marginal cost rm is excluded for all orders of declarations, two additional requirements are needed. The rst is that the maximal capacity of rm j is smaller than that of rm i; the second is that the maximal payo that j can obtain in the cartel fi; jg is larger than the one it can obtain in cartel (N). These conditions seem fairly unrestrictive: as rm i has a lower marginal cost function than j it is reasonable to assume that it has installed a higher capacity; while it is quite plausible that a rm can obtain more in a two-rm than in a threerm cartel. obviously, if cartel (N) was not feasible, as in the introductory example, then this second condition is trivially met.
As it can be seen from the Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, these two conditions are superuous for all orders of declaration except when k is the rst to declare. In this case k in order to induce j to enter the cartel fj; kg must give to j a p a yo at least as great as the maximum payo that j could obtain in the cartel fi; jg, W j (i; j). The same is true if k wants to induce i to enter the cartel fi; kg, that is k must give W i (i; j). Thus, k will prefer the cartel fj; kg if it gets a higher payo in it rather than in fi; kg , given the constraints imposed by what he must oer to j and i. This is the case if the conditions in Part 3 of Proposition 1 are met, as it is shown by Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
Equilibria of the cartel formation game with costless reentry
It has been shown in section 2.3, that the case with costless reentry diers from the one with unprotable reentry only by the fact that in the former case the minimal payo required by a rm, say j, to participate to a tworms cartel, say fi; jg, is equal to maxf0; w j (N)g while in the latter case 8 Note that if the cartel fj; kg were also feasible then the grand cartel could form with rm i being the rst rm to declare and rm j (resp. rm k) the second one provided that W j (j; k) (resp. W k (j; k)) is strictly smaller than the highest payo rm j (resp. rm k) can obtain in V (N).
it equals w j (i; j). Accordingly if cartels fi; jg and fi; kg are feasible, that is, if w j (N) and w k (N) are negative, then the minimal payo obtained by rms j and k in these cartels are equal to zero. Therefore, the highest payo rm i can obtain in a cartel, W i (s), depends on both the marginal and xed costs of its partner. More precisely, let q 0 h be the rival's output which leads to zero prot for rm h when it plays its best reply, q R h (q o h ), that is, q o h is such that h (q R h (q 0 h ); q 0 h ) = 0. Furthermore, for all q 2 X 0 h with X 0 h = [ 0 ; q 0 h ), letq h (q) be the smallest quantity produced by h which gives it a zero prot whenever its rivals produce q, that is,q h (q) is such that: h (q h (q); q ) 0 and @ h (q h (q); q )=@q h > 0. We h a ve:
Lemma 2 Suppose all our assumptions except assumption 1 hold. There exists < 1 such that, if cartels fi; jg and fi; kg are f e asible and ( j ; F j ) and ( k ; F k ) are such thatq k (q) >q j (q) for all q 2 X 0 j \ X 0 k , then W i (i; j)> W i (i; k) > W i (N) for all 2 ( ; 1).
Considering Figure 2 , the proof of this result is clearly quite obvious and is thus omitted. It must be noticed that a necessary and sucient condition for W i (i; j)>W i (i; k) to hold would involve a comparison of the cost structure of the three rms. We thus choose to state our results in terms of a sucient condition which actually requires only the comparison of rms j and k average cost function.
Clearly, Lemma 2 here will play the role of Lemma 1 in the case of noreentry. It therefore follows: Proposition 2 Suppose all our assumptions except assumption 1 hold. There exists < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) and for any order of declaration we have:
1. A cartel forms, 2. let S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; N g andq j (q)<q k (q) for all q 2 X 0 j \ X 0 k , then cartels fi; kg and N do not form, 3. let S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg; N g and (i) q i (q) <q j (q) for all q 2 X 0 i \ X 0 j , (ii) q i (q) <q k (q) for all q 2 X 0 i \ X 0 k , (iii) q j (q) <q k (q) for all q 2 X 0 j \ X 0 k then cartels fi; kg; fj; kg and N do not form.
This Proposition 9 contrasts with our previous results in two ways: First, the grand cartel, N, does not form, so that if seeing that there exists a predatory strategy it will be played i.e. predation occurs. This comes from the fact that, as long as cartels fi; jg and fi; kg are feasible, the minimal payo rms j and k will obtain in both a two-rm cartel and in the grand cartel is equal to zero. It then follows that rm i can always obtain a larger payo in a two-rm cartel than in the grand cartel (see Lemma 3). Consequently if rm i is the rst rm to declare it will never propose the formation of the grand cartel. On the other hand if it is rm j (resp. rm k) which is the rst to declare then it will never propose the formation of the grand cartel. Indeed if it does so then both rm i and rm k (resp. rm j) can obtain a higher payo than the one proposed in rm j's (resp. rm k's) declaration by making compatible declarations which propose the formation of the cartel fi; kg (resp. fi; jg).
The second dierence between the results with costless reentry and the ones with unprotable reentry can be illustrated if we suppose that rms have identical xed costs 10 . In this caseq j (q) <q k (q) for all q 2 X 0 j \ X 0 k will hold if and only if j < k . Then Proposition 2 states simply that the rm with the highest marginal cost function will be predated. Therefore with costless reentry, contrary to what happens in the unproptable reentry case, a low marginal cost constitues a strong advantage to face predation. On the other hand, if we suppose that i = j = k then the conditions used in Proposition 2 will be satised if and only if F i < F j < F k . Hence we nd back a result stated rst by Ghemawat and Nalebu (1985) for declining industries according to which the rm with the largest capacities i.e. with the highest xed cost level is the rst rm to exit the market. Such conclusion has also be drawn by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) from the analysis of an incomplete information game.
To conclude with, if we are able to rank the rms with respect to their average cost function then Proposition 2 states that the exiting rm is the one with the highest average cost function.
Robustness of the results with unprotable reentry
One specic feature of the cartel formation game presented above is that each rm in its declaration proposes simultaneously a particular cartel and the payos that each member of the cartel will receive. As a consequence, the cartel formation game gives to all rms a strong inuence on the way payos are allocated among cartel members. This seems reasonable when reentry costs are negligible. In this case indeed the production game remains a three players game even if a rm exits the market. However when reentry costs are large, the production game becomes a two players game once a rm decides to stay out of the market. In this case one can ask the question if the cartel formation game does not give to the exiting rm an unrealistically excessive inuence on the equilibrium of the resulting two rms production game which shall be played. In order to provide an answer, we shall analyze the sensitivity of the ineciencies stated in Proposition 1 to the way rms are supposed to coordinate.
To i n v estigate this issue we look at a two step coordination process where the exiting rm has no inuence on the way the remaining rms will share the gains from cooperation in the production game. This coordination process constitutes a game: its rst step is a substitute for the cartel formation game presented before. The only dierence is that it is now supposed that a rm declaration only consists of a feasible cartel, s. If all declarations dier the game ends and each rm receives its reservation payo g i . Otherwise one moves to the second step.
The second step consists of a negotiation between the members of the cartel given in the identical declarations of the rst step, s a y s, to determine a p a yo vector, p, belonging to V (s). If a rm does not belong to s then its action set in this step is simply fdo nothingg.
We shall not specify explicitely the bargaining game procedure. We assume instead that, the gains from cooperation (i.e. the actual payo minus the sum of appropriately discounted Cournot prots of the one-shot quantity game) are shared according to a bargaining solution. The bargaining solution we adopt here belongs to the family of egalitarian (also called proportional) solutions as axiomatized by Kalai (1977) and Kalai and Samet (1985) 1112 .
To be precise, let us rst assume that:
Assumption 7 For any feasible cartel, s, the Cournot equilibrium in the quantity game is unique.
Then, let c i (i; j) denote the rm i's Cournot equilibrium prot when only rms i and j are active on the market. Furthermore denote by (q e i (i; j); q e j (i; j)) the quantity vector which maximizes P i subject to P i 0 c i (i; j) = P j 0 c j (i; j) and let P e i (i; j) (resp. P e j (i; j)) be given by (10) P 1 t=0 t i (q e i (i; j); q e j (i; j)) (resp.
( 1 0 ) P 1 t=0 t j (q e j (i; j); q e i (i; j)) ). Obviously (P e i (i; j); P e j (i; j)) is the symmetric egalitarian solution 13 to the cooperative bargaining game dened by a set of outcomes given by F(i; j) and a statu-quo point given by ( c i (i; j); c j (i; j)). We can immediately state:
Lemma 3 Let all our assumptions except 2 be satised. Furthermore, for any feasible two-rms cartel, say fh; lg, suppose that (q e h (h; l); q e l (h; l)) belongs to ]0; q h [2]0; q l [ and that there exits (q h ; q l ) 0 which maximizes P h + P l .
Then there exists < 1 such that, for all > , P e i (i; k) > P e i (i; j) if and only if k > j . 11 This kind of structure has already been used in the literature. For instance, in Grossman and Hart (1986) , two agents rst choose non-cooperatively and simultaneously a level of investment and then, given these investments, take actions such that the gains from renegotiation, which correspond to the gains from cooperation in our framework, is shared equally. In their context, this corresponds also to the Nash bargaining solution. The Groosman and Hart's analysis has been extended by Hart and Moore (1990) to many agents and the bargaining solution adopted there to share the gain from trade is the Shapley value.
We adopt here an egalitarian solution one the one hand because it is much more tractable than the other ones (in particular the Nash bargaining solution), and on the other hand because the egalitarian solutions are the only ones which, in the presence of other standard requirements, satisfy the monotonicity property (see Kalai and Samet (1985) ). This condition simply states that if the feasible set of one coalition increases and the feasible sets of all other coalitions remain the same, then none of the members of this coalition should become worse o because of this change.
12 Note that similar results could be obtained by using the symmetric Nsah bargaining solution.
13 It will be obvious to verify that the results presented below will hold if we take an asymmetric egalitarian solution provided the weight of rm i in the solution depends negatively on i and is independent on the xed costs level.
Notice that the rst additional assumption in this Lemma will simply guarantee that there exists a feasible payo vector strictly greater than the Cournot equilibrium prots vector.
Again an increase in j will have t w o eects on the cooperative bargaining game involving rms i and j: On the one hand, it leads to a modication in the set of feasible outcomes which aects negatively the payo of rm i at the egalitarian solution while, on the other hand, it increases (resp. decreases) rm i's (resp. rm j's) statu-quo payo which will rise the rm i's payo at the egalitarian solution. The Lemma 14 states simply that the positive eect arising from the move in the statu-quo payo dominates the negative eect coming from the reduction in the set of feasible outcomes.
This result will play, for Proposition 3 below, the role played by Lemma 1 and 2 for Proposition 1 and 2 respectively. T o see this it suces to realize that the set of subgame perfect equilibria of the game deriving from the two step procedure here considered coincides with the one of the cartel formation game where a rm i's declaration consists of a feasible cartel, s i , to which rm i belongs and of a payo vector which gives to each rm in s i the symmetric egalitarian payo dened above 15 and a zero payo to a rm (if any) which does not belong to s i . F ormally the set of rm i's declarations is now D i = f(s; p) j i 2 s; s 2 S ; for all h 2 s p h = p e h (s) and, for l 6 2 s; p l = 0 g.
Therefore we have:
Proposition 3 Let all assumptions in Lemma 3 hold. Then there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ( ; 1) and whatever the order of declaration we have:
1. A cartel forms, 2. if S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; N g and j < k , then cartel fi; jg does not form, 3. if S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg; N g and i < j < k , then cartels fi; jg and fi; kg do not form.
14 The proof of this result comes quite straightforwardly from the application of the envelope theorem as well as the Folk theorem. Hence it will be omitted. 15 To save space we do not dene formally the egalitarian payo when the three rms are active. However this can easily be done even if one wants to consider a coalition form game instead of a cooperative bargaining game. Anyway this does not matter for our analysis.
This shows the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the inuence of the exiting rm on the way p a yos are allocated in the production game.
Concluding remarks
We h a ve considered in this paper a dynamic production game involving three rms which are dierentiated according to their cost function. More precisely we have assumed that rms can be ranked unambiguously according to their marginal cost function and that their xed cost may dier. Furthermore we suppose that one rm can be credibly forced to stay out of the market by the two others and that at least two rms can be put under such a threat. We then investigate the cost characteristics of the exiting rm under two alternative hypothesis concerning the possibility of reentry namely the case where reentry is unprotable in any circumstances due to the presence of large sunk costs, and the one where reentry is costless.
We h a ve obtained two predictions (which appears quite robust to the specication of the cartel formation game). First if reentry is always unprofitable then the exiting rm has the lowest marginal cost function as compared with the marginal cost function of the rms which can credibly be predated. Furthermore this result does not depend on the level of xed costs 16 . Accordingly, in this case, cost ineciencies will arise since the exiting rm is the one which uses the most ecient technology.
A second result is that when reentry is costless and when we can rank rms according to their average cost function then the exiting rm has the larger average cost function as compared to the average cost function of the rms which can be put under the threat of predation. Therefore in this case cost ineciencies do not appear.
The result obtained in the no-reentry case looks strange since it goes against the common belief that the most ecient rm will remain on the market. But this belief has been developped in the context of \neo-classical economics". If instead we look at this result from the point of view of \trans-action cost economics" (as developped in Williamson (1985) for instance) then they appear rather unsurprising. Indeed in this context such kind of ineciencies are frequently obtained. It is worthwhile emphasizing the deep relationship between our analysis and the transaction cost approach. Indeed although the latter approach focuses mainly on the internal organisation of the rm the present study shows that the basic points which distinguish transaction cost economics from other economic approches are also well suited to study the composition of an industry and more generally to make substantial progresses in the understanding of the formation and composition of groups or coalitions on a market.
Roughly speaking transaction cost economics seeks to analyse situations involving agents characterized by opportunism and bounded r ationality where (i) agents will meet frequently, ( ii) agents do not rely on courts for settling disputes among them i.e. private ordering prevails, (iii) agents have the opportunity to make asset specic investments and (iv) agents evolve i n a n uncertain environment.
In the present analysis we have ruled out both uncertainty and bounded rationality since these characteristics appear unessential for our results. Note furthermore that frequency will not be relevant here as the example given in the Introduction points out. The dierence between opportunism and self-interested behavior does not matter here because the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria and the set of Nash equilibria of the production game coincides for a discount factor suciently close to zero. We shall however argue that if we make abstraction of the presence of either private ordering or asset specic investments then the cost ineciencies obtained in the paper disappear.
Let us begin with private ordering. Many exchange analysis suppose that ecacious rules of law are in place so that any disagreement regarding the execution of a contract is settled by courts in a fully informed and low-cost way. This assumption of court ordering is very convenient since it allows to disregard the ex-post side of a contract. In our context, rms cannot rely on court since the kind of contract they are willing to do is simply illegal. An immediate consequence of private ordering is that we cannot disregard the execution phase of the contract since the latter must be self enforcing. This entails that rms, as is supposed in the cartel formation game, will only consider payo vectors which can be associated with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the production game.
But suppose to the contrary that rms can rely costlessly on court to enforce an agreement. This implies that the set of payo vectors that must now be considered in the cartel formation game coincides with the one cor-responding to the costless reentry case. Indeed, a rm which can be forced to exist can commit to obey an agreement in which it receives a zero payo. Without this possibility of commitment, such an agreement is not credible in the no-reentry case while it is in the case of costless reentry. Consequently, the result stated in Lemma 2 will hold even if reentry is unprotable and the exiting rm is the one with the highest average cost function (see Proposition 2 for a more precise statement). Therefore the cost ineciencies disappear once court ordering is allowed for. Remark that this clearly shows that considering tacit cooperation between rms as illegal is possibly costly.
Let us now turn to the asset specic character of investments. Investments are said wholly asset specic if they are unredeployable. Accordingly investment costs are sunk for wholly asset specic investments while they are xed when investment looses its asset specic character. The main consequence of the presence of asset specic investment is the occurence of the fundamental transformation. The latter concept refers to the transformation in the nature of the competition prevailing before and after the adoption of the contract.
In our context, the sunk reentry cost we have introduced can simply be interpreted as the cost of unredeployable investments. More precisely, the unprotable reentry case corresponds to the situation where large asset specic investments must be achieved before being active on the market while in the costless reentry case such investments are negligible. When reentry is unprotable the fundamental transformation occurs since, once a rm exits, the production game becomes a two players game. If instead reentry is costless this transformation does not occur. Indeed, in this case even if a rm exits it can participate to the punishment of a deviation from the equilibrium path by one of the two rms which remain on the market. In other words the production game still involves three players even if a rm exits the market. As we have shown, cost ineciencies appear only in the case of unprotable reentry which means that the presence of large asset specic investments is a necessary condition for such cost ineciencies to occur. can make a declaration with p ki > W i (i; j) and s = fi; kg. Therefore, since a cartel forms and using subgame perfection, fi; jg cannot form.
1.3 Let S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg; N g and i < j < k , then cartel fi; jg does not form. Furthermore if in addition q j q i and W j (i; j) W j (N) then cartels fi; jg and fi; kg do not form. Summing up, if k is the last rm to declare, Lemma 1 is sucient to ensure that the cartel which form is either fj; kg or N.
8.2.5 Suppose that rm j is the last rm to declare:
1. Let rm k be the second rm to declare. For the cartel fi; jg to form it must be the case that d i 2 D j nD k and d k is such that p kj p ij (the equality between p kj and p ij is allowed only if rm j, facing two indierent alternatives, chooses to declare d j = d i ). In this case rm j will obtain at most W j (i; j) while rm k will obtain a zero payo. 8.2.6 Suppose that rm i is the last rm to declare:
The arguments to prove the results stated in the proposition are so close than those used in the previous case that we omit them here.
Lemma 4
Let the maximal payo that rm k can obtain in V (i; k) subject to P i = W i (i; j) be denoted byw k (i; k).Similarly, w k (j; k) stands for the maximal payo that rm k can obtain in 2 subject to P j = W j (i; j).
Lemma 4: Suppose all our assumptions except assumption 2 hold.
Furthermore let S = ffi; jg; fi; kg; fj; kg; N g, i < j < k , q j q i and W j (i; j) W j (N). Then there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ( ;1)w k (i; k) <w k (j; k).
The proof is available upon request.
